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Abstract
The voting rule considered in this paper belongs to a large class of voting
systems, called “range voting” or “utilitarian voting”, where each voter rates each
candidate with the help of a given evaluation scale and the winner is the candidate
with the highest total score. In approval voting the evaluation scale only consists
of two levels: 1 (approval) and 0 (non approval). However non approval may
mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of sufficient knowledge
for evaluating the candidate. In this paper we propose a characterization of
a rule (that we refer to as dis&approval voting) that allows for a third level
in the evaluation scale. The three levels have the following interpretation: 1
means approval, 0 means indifference, abstention or ‘do not know’, and -1 means
disapproval.
1 Introduction
Consider a situation where voters are asked to answer the question: “would each
of the following candidates be a good president/head?” The question addressed
to voters is thus an absolute one.1 Voters can answer in a positive, negative
or null manner on each candidate. Voters are warned that when a candidate
receives a blank or a spoiled vote, the latter option is marked by default.
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1That is, voters are not asked to compare candidate but grade them instead. For a relative question
where voters are asked to give their best and worst candidates, see Garćıa-Lapresta et al. (2010).
Various procedures to aggregate ballots with different levels have been stud-
ied. Yilmaz (1999) proposes the ‘approval-Condorcet-elimination’ procedure. Ju
(2005) deals with social choice rules mapping each profile into a single alter-
native. Aleskerov et al. (2007) axiomatize the ‘threshold rule’. Balinski and
Laraki (2007) propose ‘majority judgment’. Gaertner and Xu (2012) axiomatize
a ranking rule with a fixed electorate where voters place the candidates into a
fixed number of categories. We investigate the ‘dis&approval rule’, that selects
the candidates who obtain the largest difference between the number of positive
votes and the number of negative votes.
Earlier references have studied the dis&approval rule. Felsenthal (1989) com-
pares it with approval voting from a voter’s point of view. A controversial con-
clusion is that no rational voter will choose to ‘abstain’ because ‘abstaining’ is a
dominated strategy. Nevertheless there is experimental evidence that people do
use abstention if they are offered that option, e.g., the framed field experiment
during the French presidential elections by Baujard et al. (2012). A possible
reason for this behavior is that these people prefer to abstain rather than ex-
pressing a random or a false opinion. Hillinger (2004, 2005) advocates for using
the dis&approval rule for general elections under the term ‘evaluative voting’.
Lepelley and Smaoui (2012) study some of its properties. However the literature
has not provided a characterization of this rule. We focus on providing one such
characterization.
Young (1974) characterizes the Borda count with the help of four axioms.
Fishburn (1978a, 1978b) provides the analogue axioms for ballot aggregation
that characterize approval voting. Alós-Ferrer (2006) shows that one of Fish-
burn’s axioms (neutrality) is unnecessary and provides a characterization2 based
on faithfulness, cancellation and consistency. Faithfulness requires that if the so-
ciety consists of one individual, his or her approved candidate(s) is (are) selected.
Cancellation requires that whenever all candidates receive the same number of ap-
provals, the full set of candidates is selected. Consistency requires that whenever
there are common selected candidates for two disjoint societies, those candidates
that were selected for both of the original societies are exactly the candidates
that are selected for the joint society. In this paper we provide a characteriza-
tion of the dis&approval rule in similar terms. However we make note that the
adapted version of cancellation to our context with three-option ballots is not
sufficient for our purpose, and a stronger (under adapted faithfulness and consis-
tency) requirement is introduced in its place, namely a ‘compensation’ property.
This requires that if all candidates receive as many approvals as disapprovals,
then the full set of candidates is selected.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setting and
notation. Section 3 provides a characterization of the dis&approval rule and
the discussion about the necessity of replacing ‘cancellation’ by ‘compensation’.
2For a review of the axiomations of approval voting see Xu (2010). More generally Ju (2010)
provides a survey on “simple preferences”, i.e., the case when individuals have either dichotomous or
trichotomous preferences.
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In Section 4 we check the independence of the axioms in our characterization.
Section 5 concludes with some remarks.
2 Notation and terminology
Consider a fixed set C = {x1, ..., xm} of m > 2 candidates and an electorate of n
voters. Voters are asked to cast a (ternary) ballot T where, for each candidate,
they can vote either “in favor”, or “against”, or “indifferent, abstain or do not
know”. Voters are warned that when a candidate receives a blank vote, the latter
option is marked by default. Thus a voter’s ternary ballot T on the fixed set
of candidates can be represented by a 3-partition of C, and we denote by T+
the candidates whom the voter approves, T− are the candidates whom the voter
disapproves, and T 0 are the remaining candidates (i.e., those who either leave the
voter indifferent, or on whom the voter does not emit an opinion, or on whom the
voter admits ignorance). We let TD be the ternary ballot with T
− = C, and TI
is the ternary ballot with T 0 = C. A voter that casts TI is called unconcerned.
If a voter does not show up then she is unconcerned, i.e., her ternary ballot is
TI . Also, with each ternary ballot T we associate its reverse ballot T± such
that T+± = T
− and T−± = T
+ (thus T 0± = T
0 ).
Let T denote the set of all ternary ballots on the set of candidates C. In line
with the inspiring Alós-Ferrer (2006), an anonymous voter response profile of
ternary ballots (or voter response profile for simplicity) is a mapping π : T −→ N.
We interpret π(T ) as the number of voters that cast ballot T , thus the concept
of a voter response profile incorporates anonymity. Clearly, one cannot recover
the original list of ternary ballots from its induced voter response profile (of
ternary ballots). The class of all voter response profiles is denoted by Π, thus
we are allowing for variable electorate size and the number of voters in the
electorate is
∑
T∈T π(T ). Every T ∈ T can be identified with πT such that
πT (T ) = 1, πT (T ′) = 0 if T ′ 6= T, T ′ ∈ T . Summing up two voter response
profiles corresponds to merging the vote profiles of two disjoint societies. With
each π ∈ Π we associate π± ∈ Π such that π±(T ) = π(T±) for all T ∈ T .
Definition 1 A ballot aggregation function on voter response profiles is a cor-
respondence W that assigns a non-empty set of candidates to every π ∈ Π.
Each W given by Definition 1 is anonymous since voter response profiles of
ternary ballots capture the number of ballots of each type without any reference
to specific voters. Furthermore, anonymous ballot aggregation functions on vote
profiles (i.e., on the actual list of ballots cast by the electorate) can be defined
from Definition 1 because vote profiles naturally induce voter response profiles.
The following tallies are defined for each voter response profile π ∈ Π and
xi ∈ C: candidate xi’s number of supporters: n+i (π) =
∑
T∈T , xi∈T+ π(T ), can-




T∈T , xi∈T− π(T ), and the number of




T∈T , xi∈T 0 π(T ). Therefore
for each electorate with n voters, n+i (π) + n
0
i (π) + n
−
i (π) = n for every xi ∈ C.
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The following related remark will be of use to produce voter response profiles in
Example 1 and in the proof of Theorem 1:
Remark 1 For each m-tuple of integer triplets ((a1, b1, c1), · · · , (am, bm, cm))
verifying ai + bi + ci = n for all i = 1, ...,m, there exists (at least) one voter re-
sponse profile π ∈ Π with n voters such that: n+i (π) = ai, n
−
i (π) = bi, n
0
i (π) = ci
for all i = 1, ...,m. To see it, one can consider the ordered profile in which every
candidate xi is approved by the first ai voters, disapproved by the next bi voters,
and considered as indifferent by the last ci voters.
3 A characterization of the dis&approval vot-
ing rule
The dis&approval rule is the ballot aggregation function WD where WD(π) is the





WD(π) = arg maxxi∈C vi(π). That is to say, the rule aggregates the ternary
ballots by adding up numbers (where 1 is for the ‘approve’ option, −1 is for the
‘disapprove’ option, and 0 is attached to the remaining cases as expressed in the
‘abstain’ option), and then it selects the candidates with highest score. Since this
rule is invariant under strictly positive affine transformations, the result of the
computation does not change if we replace the (1, 0,−1) scale by e.g., (2, 1, 0).3
The first case is supported by Hillinger (2004, Section 3, and 2005), who claimed
“It is a common experience that in addition to feeling positive or negative about
candidates or issues, we may also feel neutral.” The second one is the subject of
a study by Baujard and Igersheim (2011).
It is easy to check that the dis&approval rule satisfies the three axioms that
characterize the approval rule (v. Alós-Ferrer, 2006) when they are extended to
the ternary ballots framework as we proceed to specify. For ternary ballots we
use the same terms, adding a ∗ to avoid a confusing and unnecessary multiplicity
of terms. Consistency can be adapted without changes. It requires that whenever
there are common selected candidates for two disjoint societies, those candidates
that were selected for both of the original societies are exactly those who are
selected for the joint society. Formally:
Consistency∗: for each π, π′ ∈ Π, if W (π) ∩W (π′) 6= ∅ then W (π + π′) =
W (π) ∩W (π′).
In the binary ballots framework cancellation requires that whenever all candi-
dates receive the same number of approvals, the full set of candidates is selected.
In order to adapt it to the ternary ballots framework, we require that whenever
all candidates receive the same number of approvals and the same number of
disapprovals, then the full set of candidates is selected. Formally:
3There is however evidence that the votes vary with the precise specification that is conveyed to
the voters. The first scale tends to produce fewer ‘penalising’ or ‘disapproval’ votes than the second
one: see Baujard et al. (2012).
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Cancellation∗: for each π ∈ Π, if for all xi, xj ∈ C it is true that n+i (π) = n
+
j (π)
and n−i (π) = n
−
j (π) then W (π) = C.
In the binary ballots framework faithfulness requires that if the society con-
sists of one individual then his or her approved candidate(s) is (are) selected.
In the ternary ballots framework we have to state what happens in case the
individual approves no candidate. Under such circumstance, in our version all
candidates are selected if all candidates are disapproved, otherwise the candidates
for whom the individual is indifferent are selected.4 Formally:
Faithfulness∗: for each T ∈ T ,
W (πT ) = W (T ) =

T+ if T+ 6= ∅,
C if T− = C,
T 0 otherwise.
Nonetheless these three properties, namely, consistency∗, cancellation∗ and
faithfulness∗, do not characterize the dis&approval voting. Although they are
implied by this rule, they do not uniquely determine it. We demonstrate this in
Example 1 below:
Example 1 Define W ∗(π) as the subset of C formed by the candidates xi that




i (π). This expression defines a ballot aggregation
function that satisfies consistency∗, cancellation∗ and faithfulness∗. However W ∗
is different from the dis&approval rule. Consider m = 2 and by Remark 1, let
π ∈ Π be such that n+1 (π) = 1, n
−
1 (π) = 0, n
0
1(π) = 5, and n
+
2 (π) = n
−
2 (π) = 3,
n02(π) = 0. Then W
∗(π) = {x2} because u1(π) = 2 < 3 = u2(π), but WD(π) =
{x1} because v1(π) = 1 > 0 = v2(π).
In order to characterize the dis&approval rule we replace cancellation∗ with
an alternative property, that we refer to as compensation∗. It states that if all
candidates receive the same number of approvals and of disapprovals then the
set of selected candidates is the whole set of candidates. Formally:
Compensation∗: for each π ∈ Π, n+i (π) = n
−
i (π) for all xi ∈ C implies W (π) =
C.
Observe that ifW is a ballot aggregation function that satisfies compensation∗
then W (T + T±) = C for all T ∈ T . Proposition 1 below demonstrates that
compensation∗ is stronger than cancellation∗ in the presence of consistency∗
and faithfulness∗. Then Lemma 1 proves that if we assume compensation∗ and
consistency∗, then the distribution of votes other than approved/disapproved
does not affect the outcomes of W .
Proposition 1 If a ballot aggregation function W satisfies consistency∗, faith-
fulness∗, and compensation∗, then it satisfies cancellation∗.
4This is in line with the role of this property in the characterization by Alós-Ferrer (2006), as
explained in his Footnote 3.
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Proof. Suppose π ∈ Π is such that for all xi, xj ∈ C it is true that n+i (π) =
n+j (π) and n
−
i (π) = n
−
j (π). We need to prove that W (π) = C. If n
+
i (π) = n
−
i (π)
for all xi ∈ C then W (π) = C by compensation∗. If n+i (π) 6= n
−
i (π) for each
xi ∈ C we can assume that n+i (π) = n
−
i (π) + a for some fixed a > 1 and
all xi ∈ C, since the case n+i (π) < n
−
i (π) is analogous. Define π
a− such that
πa−(TD) = a, π
a−(T ) = 0 when T 6= TD. By faithfulness∗ we have W (πa−) = C,
and compensation∗ implies that W (π+πa−) = C as n+i (π+π
a−) = n−j (π+π
a−)
for all xi, xj ∈ C. Then consistency∗ entails that W (π) = C as W (π + πa−) =
W (π) ∩W (πa−). This ends the proof. 
Lemma 1 Suppose that a ballot aggregation function W satisfies compensation∗
and consistency∗. Then, for each π, π′ ∈ Π, if for all xi ∈ C it is true that
n+i (π) = n
+
i (π
′) and n−i (π) = n
−
i (π
′), then W (π) = W (π′).
Proof. Suppose π, π′ ∈ Π are such that for all xi ∈ C it is true that n+i (π) =
n+i (π
′) and n−i (π) = n
−
i (π
′). Compensation∗ yields W (π + π±) = C = W (π
′ +
π±). Consistency
∗ yields W (π) = W (π + π′ + π±) = W (π
′). 
Lemma 1 ensures that unconcerned voters do not affect the outcomes of W ,
in the sense that for each π ∈ Π, W (π) = W (π + TI).
Theorem 1 The dis&approval rule is the only ballot aggregation function sat-
isfying compensation∗, faithfulness∗, and consistency∗.5
Proof. We need to prove that if W is a ballot aggregation function that sat-
isfies compensation∗, faithfulness∗, and consistency∗ then it coincides with the
dis&approval rule WD. Using Lemma 1 we deduce that for such purpose any
π ∈ Π is characterized by the m-tuple of triplets











We proceed to prove that for each π ∈ Π, W (π) is the set of candidates xi




i (π) is highest. Let us fix π ∈ Π.
From consistency∗, we get W (π) = W (π′) with π′ = π+π = 2π. Observe that
n0i (π
′) is an even integer for each i = 1, ...,m. Let α = max{n0i (π′) : 1 6 i 6 m}.
We invoke Remark 1 to produce some auxiliary voter response profiles as follows.











i (π̃) = α−n0i (π′). From compensation∗ we
obtain W (π̃) = C and consistency∗ ensures
W (π) = W (π′) = W (π′ + π̃). (1)
5We are indebted to an anonymous referee for providing the proof of Theorem 1 that we present
here, which is more direct than our original argument. Furthermore, we stress that working with ballot
aggregation functions on voter response profiles implicitly builds anonymity into the framework.
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Secondly, when α > 0 we first let π̄ be a voter response profile characterized
by: for each i = 1, ...,m, n+i (π̄) = 0, n
−
i (π̄) = 0 and n
0
i (π̄) = α. Then we let π0 be
















i (π0) = 0. We have π
′+π̃ = π0+π̄ and from
compensation∗ (or faithfulness∗), W (π̄) = C. Hence consistency∗ together with
(1) yield W (π) = W (π0). When α = 0 we just let π0 = π
′ thus W (π) = W (π0)
holds true due to (1).
Because n+i (π






= n+i (π0) − n
−
i (π0), in order
to prove that W (π) is the set of candidates xi such that vi(π) is maximal among
C, it suffices to show that W (π0) is the set of candidates xi for which vi(π0) =
n+i (π0)− n
−
i (π0) is maximal. To prove this we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: n+i (π0) = 0 for every xi. Every candidate xi maximizes vi(π0) be-
cause n+i (π0) is constant across agents. Furthermore, all agents are disapproved
by every voter, hence by faithfulness∗ and consistency∗ (or more directly, by
compensation∗), we obtain W (π0) = C.
Case 2: n+i (π0) > 0 for some xi ∈ C. Let β = min{n
−
i (π0) : 1 6 i 6 m}.
When β = 0 we let π′0 = π0. Otherwise let π
′
0 be a voter response profile










i (π0) − β and n0i (π′0) = 0 for
each i = 1, ...,m, and let π̂ be a voter response profile characterized by n+i (π̂) =
n0i (π̂) = 0 and n
−
i (π̂) = β for each i = 1, ...,m,. When β > 0, from faithfulness
∗
and consistency∗ we have W (π̂) = C, and because π0 = π
′
0 + π̂, consistency
∗
yields W (π0) = W (π
′




W (T ) (2)
because there is xi with xi ∈ T+ whenever π′0(T ) > 0, hence consistency∗ applies.
By construction, a candidate xi maximizes vi(π0) along C if and only if
n−i (π
′
0) = 0. Therefore xi maximizes vi(π0) along C if and only if xi ∈ T+
whenever π′0(T ) > 0. By appealing to faithfulness
∗, xi maximizes vi(π0) along C
if and only if xi ∈W (T ) whenever π′0(T ) > 0. Now (2) proves that xi maximizes
vi(π0) along C if and only if xi ∈W (π′0). 
4 Independence of the axioms
In order to prove that the axioms in Theorem 1 are independent, we first ob-
serve that Example 1 verifies faithfulness∗, consistency∗, but not compensation∗.
Furthermore, the trivial rule Wt(π) = C for each π ∈ Π verifies consistency∗,
compensation∗, but not faithfulness∗. We complete the argument with the fol-
lowing example that proves that consistency∗ is independent of the conjunction
of faithfulness∗ and compensation∗:
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Example 2 Define a ballot aggregation function W ∗t as follows: the full set of
candidates is always elected unless there is a single voter, in which case the rule
is built to satisfy faithfulness∗. In formal terms, for each π ∈ Π









T∈T π(T ) = 1, π(T1) = 1, T
+
1 = ∅, and T 01 6= ∅,
C otherwise.
Notice that W ∗t verifies compensation
∗: provided n+i (π) = n
−
i (π) for all
xi ∈ C, W ∗t (π) = C arises both when the number of voters is greater than 1
(by construction) or exactly 1 (because the only possible case is that of a single
unconcerned voter).
However W ∗t does not verify consistency
∗. Consider the ballot T2 such that
T+2 = {x1} and T 02 = C \ {x1}, and let π be given by π(T2) = 2, π(T ) = 0
when T 6= T2. Then we have W ∗t (πT2) ∩ W ∗t (πT2) 6= W ∗t (πT2 + πT2), because
W ∗t (π
T2) ∩W ∗t (πT2) = {x1} and W ∗t (πT2 + πT2) = W ∗t (π) = C.
5 Conclusion
The properties in our characterization of the dis&approval rule suffice to dis-
cuss on its virtues and faults, but of course they do not exhaust the list of its
relevant attributes. They have further implications like cancellation and others,
and knowing them helps to understand the normative behavior of the rule. To
conclude let us review some of other classical properties. Dis&approval voting
satisfies neutrality: the names of the candidates do not matter. It also satisfies
unanimity: if all voters vote in favor of some candidate(s), then this (these) can-
didate(s) should be selected. Independence of irrelevant alternatives also holds
true: if a non-selected candidate is removed from the list of candidates and this
does not affect the voters’ ballots for the remaining candidates, then the selected
candidates do not change.
Furthermore, dis&approval voting satisfies some practical properties advanced
by Brams and Fishburn (2005, p. 461) as arguments in favor of approval vot-
ing. Approval voting gives more flexible options than plurality voting, increases
voter turnout, gives minority candidates their proper due, and is as eminently
practicable. Dis&approval voting still enriches the options offered by approval
voting by allowing voters to explicitly express disagreement with some (or all)
candidates. If voters are better able to express their preferences they are more
likely to vote. As under approval voting, minority candidates will not suffer. If
supporters are allowed to vote for several candidates, they will not be tempted to
desert a candidate who is weak in the polls (the so-called wasted vote). Finally,
dis&approval voting is also simple for voters to understand and use. The thumb
up or thumb down vote in Community Question Answering sites such as Yahoo!
Answers illustrates that it is easy to ask users to cast a positive or negative vote
(along with the possibility of abstaining).
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Another interesting property stems from a practice explicitly used in countries
such as UK, Australia, or Canada: pairing. The glossary of the UK Parliament
defines pairing6 as “an arrangement where one MP from a party agrees with an
MP of an opposing party not to vote in a particular division. This gives both
MPs the opportunity not to attend. [...] pairings can last for months or years.”
Formally, a voting rule W is not affected by pairing if for each π ∈ Π and T ∈ T ,
W (π + T + T±) = W (π). It is not difficult to check that dis&approval voting is
not affected by pairing (because it both satisfies consistency and compensation).
In our view the most important practical property of dis&approval voting is
that it explicitly allows voters to express dissatisfaction. If dissatisfaction with
politicians is often observed in polls, no legitimate and explicit negative option is
generally provided to electors. There are some exceptions. In the State of Nevada
voters can express their disapproval of all official candidates with the “none of
the above candidate” option (Arcelus, Mauser and Spindler, 1978). In 1987 the
deputies elections were reorganized in the former Soviet Union. Under the new
rule,7 voters crossed off the names of those against whom they wished to vote
(Hahn, 1988). The same rule is used in some Chinese village elections (Zhong and
Chen, 2002). For some other historical examples of rules that include negative
options, see Kang (2010). With an exception of the above examples the usual
ways to voice in elections are absenteeism, spoiled or blank vote, or voting for an
unviable candidate. These latter practices may be reduced under dis&approval
voting, an hypothesis that would be worth testing.
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Brest, June 2012.
[23] Yılmaz, M. R., 1999, Can we improve upon approval voting?, European
Journal of Political Economy 15, 89-100.
[24] Young, P., 1974, An axiomatization of Borda’s rule, Journal of Economic
Theory 9, 43-52.
[25] Xu, Y., 2010, Axiomatizations of approval voting. In: J.-F. Laslier and
M.R. Sanver (eds.), Handbook on Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and
Welfare, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 91-102.
[26] Zhong, Y. and J. Chen, 2002, To vote or not to vote: an analysis of peasants’
participation in Chinese village elections, Comparative Political Studies 35;
686-712.
11
